Assume that India and Pakistan are engaged in an increasingly volatile situation over the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir with a Kargil type infiltration by Pakistan. A conventional war between both the countries is inevitable under the shadow of nuclear weapons

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Q: 39 (CDS-I/2012)
Assume that India and Pakistan are engaged in an increasingly volatile situation over the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir with a Kargil type infiltration by Pakistan. A conventional war between both the countries is inevitable under the shadow of nuclear weapons. In this situation, what is the nuclear capacity that India should possess against Pakistan to deter a nuclear exchange ?

question_subject: 

Geography

question_exam: 

CDS-I

stats: 

0,18,23,13,5,18,5

keywords: 

{'nuclear capacity': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'larger nuclear arsenal': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'nuclear policy': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'nuclear weapons': [1, 0, 0, 5], 'nuclear exchange': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'readable nuclear deterrence': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'pakistan': [3, 0, 1, 2], 'kashmir': [3, 1, 2, 2], 'intercontinental ballistic missile': [0, 0, 1, 1], 'second strike capability': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'conventional war': [0, 0, 0, 1], 'india': [8, 1, 7, 13], 'jammu': [4, 2, 0, 3], 'kargil type infiltration': [0, 0, 0, 1]}

Option 1 suggests adopting a policy of first-use nuclear weapons. This means that India would be the first to initiate a nuclear attack. However, this goes against the principle of deterrence where the threat of retaliation serves as a deterrent for an adversary to not initiate a nuclear exchange. Therefore, this option is not a suitable response in this situation.

Option 2 suggests that India should possess a much larger nuclear arsenal than Pakistan. While having a larger nuclear arsenal may provide some sense of security, it is not necessarily essential for deterrence. The size of the arsenal is not the only factor in deterring a nuclear exchange.

Option 3 suggests having a credible nuclear deterrence with second strike capability. This means that India should have the ability to retaliate even after suffering a nuclear attack. This provides a strong deterrent as it ensures that any aggression by Pakistan will result in significant consequences for them. This option aligns with the principles of deterrence and is an effective response in this situation.

Option 4 suggests having an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5000 km. While having long-range missiles can enhance India`s defense capabilities, it does not address the issue of deterrence in the context of a potential nuclear exchange with Pakistan. Therefore, it is not the most relevant